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While economic growth in Pakistan has averaged 3 percent 
over the past decade, Vision 2025 envisages it to be over 
8 percent between 2018 and 2025. Sindh, which is the 
most industrialized of the four provinces and houses the 
major seaports as well as Karachi—the economic hub of the 
country—is a key stakeholder in national economic growth. 
Nearly half of the population of Sindh is urban, and there are 
marked disparities in socioeconomic development and hu-
man development indicators between rural and urban areas. 
Policymakers in Sindh are therefore well-acquainted with the 
different but equally challenging pressures of urban and rural 
population growth. 
As Vision 2025 acknowledges and the provincial govern-
ments have experienced, a large and rapidly growing popu-
lation can hamper economic growth by pulling investments 
away from productivity development towards expanding 
needs for education, health, housing, and other infrastruc-
ture. However, it is also recognized that inherent within the 
population challenge is a potentially tremendous opportunity 
to boost economic growth.
Sindh is currently undergoing a demographic transition from 
a situation of high fertility and high mortality to one of low-
er fertility and mortality (Figure 1). The resulting bulge in its 
working-age population means the province is poised to reap 
a “demographic dividend”—the boost in income per capita 
and its growth that accrues when the share of working age 
individuals in a population rises relative to dependents, re-
sulting in a higher support ratio,1 as well as increased labor 
supply and savings. As the Asian Tigers have demonstrat-
ed, a robust working-age population can serve as a potent, 
real world pathway for achieving economic growth. However, 
harnessing the powerful thrust of the demographic dividend 
requires the timely execution of a well-conceived plan of ac-
tion involving major interventions in the education, health 
(including reproductive health/population welfare), and labor 
sectors.
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Future economic growth is likely to be closely linked, 
if not driven, by how rapidly fertility declines further.
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FIGURE 1:  EMERGING BULGE IN SINDH’S WORKING-AGE POPULATION
	  Source: Population Census 1972 Source: Population Council Projections 2015
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Encouragingly, both Vision 2025 and the Govern-
ment of Sindh government have a strong interest 
in enhancing the productive potential of the current 
and future work force through investments in edu-
cation, skills development, and job creation. How-
ever, while the need to reduce population growth is 
recognized intuitively, there is relatively low aware-
ness that the speed at which fertility declines now 
in Sindh will have a huge impact on the magnitude 
of the economic boost it is able to reap from the 
demographic dividend. A recent study of prospects 
for economic growth in Pakistan under alternative 
demographic scenarios quantified the massive dif-
ferences in growth that can be achieved with slow, 
moderate and rapid fertility decline in Sindh.2 This 
brief presents the study’s key findings to facilitate 
a deeper understanding of the connection between 
the speed of fertility decline and the size of the de-
mographic dividend, and the scale of the economic 
gains at stake.
FERTILITY DECLINE AND 
PROSPECTS OF A DEMOGRAPHIC 
DIVIDEND IN SINDH
As fertility declines in Sindh, the rate of growth in the lowest 
tiers of its population pyramid (ages 0-14) is slowing down. 
However, due to the momentum of past high fertility and cur-
rent improvements in infant and child survival, there will not 
be an appreciable change in the rate of growth of the work-
ing-age population for perhaps two decades. In proportion to 
dependents, the working-age share of the total population is 
rising.
To assess the effect of this rising support ratio on future 
economic growth, Bloom, Chen and Sathar (2015) employed 
state-of-the-art theoretical and statistical models designed 
to capture the complexity of economic growth processes and 
their interactions with demographic trends specific to the Pa-
kistani context. The model is outlined in Box 1 (back page). 
Projections of the total population were generated for three 
fertility decline scenarios—moderate decline in the total fer-
tility rate (TFR) from the current level of 3.9 to replacement 
fertility (TFR 2.1) in 2050;3 slow decline in TFR, which would 
mean that replacement fertility is reached sometime after 
2050; and rapid decline in TFR, implying that replacement 
fertility is attained before 2050. For population projections, 
the base year was 1998, when the last census was conduct-
ed, while 2011 was taken as the base year for the per capita 
income and demographic dividend comparison. The results 
of the study for Sindh are summarized in Table 1. 
As shown in Figure 2, depending on the speed of fertility de-
cline, the population of Sindh could grow to 76 million or to 
68 million by 2050. Compared to a scenario of rapid fertility 
decline, slow fertility decline implies approximately 6.2 million 
more young dependents in the population. This will translate 
into a lower support ratio—1.62, as against 1.94 with rapid 
fertility decline (Table 1). 
A higher support ratio represents an increase in the produc-
tive capacity of the economy on a per capita basis, which cre-
ates the prospect of a spurt in economic growth—the demo-
graphic dividend. To maximize the size of the demographic 
dividend, the support ratio must be maintained at optimal 
levels while the “boom” in the working-age population lasts. 
Fertility must decline as much as possible to raise the sup-
port ratio, and as fast as possible to allow the high support 
ratio to prevail over a longer period. Figure 3 presents the 
historical and prospective trend in Sindh’s support ratio and 
how it is affected by the pace of fertility decline. Notably, the 
support ratio started to rise in the late 1990s—when energet-
ic efforts were made to increase uptake of family planning—
but it is now beginning to plateau. It can be expected to rise 
significantly if a moderate or rapid pace of fertility decline is 
achieved.
“The need for lowering the growth rate of 
population is more urgent than ever.” 
VISION 2025
Scenario 1
Slow Fertility 
Decline
Scenario 2
Moderate 
Fertility Decline
Scenario 3
Rapid Fertility 
Decline
Assume TFR
Remains 0.5 
births higher 
than the mod-
erate decline 
assumption
Declines steadi-
ly to 2.1 births 
per woman by 
2050
Remains 0.5 
births lower 
than the mod-
erate decline 
assumption
Total 
Population
76.3 million 71.9 million 67.5 million
Support ratio 1.62 1.77 1.94
Per capita GDP 
Growth
328% 374% 426%
Demographic 
Dividend
137% 182% 235%
TABLE 1:  PROJECTED DEMOGRAPHICS AND ECONOMIC GROW TH 
IN SINDH IN 2050 WITH SLOW, MODERATE,  AND RAPID 
FERTILIT Y DECLINE
Source: Bloom, Chen, and Sathar 2015
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Differences in the support ratio, in turn, lead to wide diver-
gences in the per capita GDP growth attainable (Figure 4). 
In 2050, per capita income in Sindh is expected to be slight-
ly above $5,200 if fertility persists at current levels; about 
$7,700, if fertility declines slowly; and about $9,500, if fertil-
ity drops rapidly. 
This means that if the fertility rate continues to hover in the 
current vicinity of 3.9, Sindh’s GDP per capita will only be 
about 191 percent greater in 2050 than it is today; however, 
if the TFR declines rapidly, Sindh’s GDP per capita could grow 
by as much as 426 percent. In other words, a precipitous de-
cline in fertility could boost income in Sindh by 235 percent 
over current levels, independent of any additional income 
growth that occurs over this horizon. By comparison, a slow 
decline in fertility would lead to a 137 percent increase in 
income, which, significant as it is, represents only about half 
of the dividend achievable. 
The results show that, overall, for every one unit of decrease 
in the total fertility rate, GDP per capita is expected to in-
crease by 90-100 percent. Further fertility decline is going to 
be associated with a rise in per capita income, but the level of 
benefits to be accrued will multiply if there is a serious effort 
at interventions that speed up the decline while the support 
ratio is elevated. This is a strong economic argument for in-
vesting in a more rapid fertility decline in the province.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
By 2050, Sindh’s per capita income will be 191 percent 
higher than today’s levels if there is no decline in fertility, but 
426 percent higher if fertility declines rapidly. The scale and 
effectiveness of efforts to reduce fertility levels in Sindh will 
determine whether per capita income in the province grows 
by 328 percent or by 426 percent by 2050. The possible de-
mographic dividend of a 235 percent increase in per capita 
income is simply too huge to be ignored in economic growth 
strategy, especially given Sindh’s burgeoning population, re-
source constraints, and development aspirations. The find-
ings presented in this brief show clearly that, if Sindh is to 
harness the demographic dividend, planners must invest at 
least as heavily and urgently in efforts to raise the contra-
ceptive prevalence rate (CPR) as in interventions to educate, 
train and productively employ the youth bulge.
	  
FIGURE 2:  PROJECTED POPULATION GROW TH IN 
SINDH WITH SLOW, MODERATE,  AND 
RAPID FERTILIT Y DECLINE
Source: Bloom, Chen, and Sathar 2015
FIGURE 3:  HISTORICAL TRENDS AND PROJECTED 
GROW TH IN SINDH’S SUPPORT RATIO 
WITH SLOW, MODERATE,  AND RAPID 
FERTILIT Y DECLINE
Source: Bloom, Chen, and Sathar 2015
Source: Bloom, Chen, and Sathar 2015
	  
	  
FIGURE 4:  PROJECTED PER CAPITAL GDP GROW TH 
IN SINDH WITH SLOW, MODERATE,  AND 
RAPID FERTILIT Y DECLINE
“Our Vision today is to make Pakistan 
the next Asian Tiger.”
VISION 2025
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Time is of the essence. The demographic dividend is a limit-
ed-time offer, and once fertility reaches replacement levels, 
the demographic transition model predicts some semblance 
of equilibrium between fertility and mortality levels. By around 
2050, the bulge that is currently in the working-age tiers will 
have progressed through to older tiers of the pyramid, while a 
reduced population of young people will have entered Sindh’s 
work force. Accordingly, the support ratio will decline and the 
dividend window will close. 
Sindh must promptly to lower its TFR and maintain a high 
support ratio through the dividend period. The process can be 
kick-started by focusing on eliminating unmet need for family 
planning, which is estimated at 21 percent, and represents 
an opportunity for a rapid demand-driven increase in Sindh’s 
CPR from the current level of 30 percent to 51 percent. This 
alone will reduce the TFR from 3.9 to the wanted level of fer-
tility of 3.1 (PDHS 2013). In comparison, the Sindh govern-
ment’s goal of raising the CPR to 45 percent by FP2020 will 
reduce the TFR to 3.3. While increased investment in family 
planning will be entailed in eliminating unmet need, and fur-
ther efforts will be needed to ensure a continuation of the 
rapid fertility decline trajectory, the costs are more than jus-
tified by the substantially large economic boost achievable.
ENDNOTES
(1) The support ratio expresses the proportion of working-age individuals relative 
to dependents in the population. It is defined here as the working age population 
(15-59) divided by the non-working age population (<15 or>59 years). (2) D. E. 
Bloom, S. Chen and Z. Sathar, “Prospects for economic growth in Pakistan under 
alternative demographic scenarios” (Population Council, Islamabad). (3) The TFR 
measures the average number of children expected to be borne by every woman 
in a population during her lifetime. The model’s TFR assumptions for the three 
fertility decline scenarios are indicated in Table 1.
GDP growth estimations in the model follow the convergence model proposed by Barro (2004). The final multiple regression growth 
equation is derived by manipulating the Solow growth model and states the determinants of the growth of income per capita.
Where yt = log(   ) (Y is aggregate income), w = log(   ) (L is labor force) and Xt denotes time-variant control variables other than demo-
graphic variables. 
The model assumes Sindh’s total fertility rate, which currently stands at about 3.9 children per woman, will decline to the long-run 
replacement level of 2.1 children per woman. The model also assumes that life expectancy in Sindh will increase to 69 years by 2050.
To test the sensitivity to fertility rates, three fertility decline scenarios are considered:
1. Moderate fertility decline (Medium Variant), which assumes that the TFR declines at a steady pace and reaches replacement 
level (2.1 births per women) by 2050.
2. Rapid fertility decline (Low Variant), which assumes that TFR is 0.5 births lower than under the medium fertility (1.6 births per 
woman) assumption throughout.
3. Slow fertility decline (High Variant), which assumes that the TFR is 0.5 births higher than under the medium fertility (2.6 births 
per woman) assumption throughout. 
An indicator “IDD” is introduced, which measures the relative size of demographic dividend and is defined as
IDDi  =                     .     
Where yi2050 is the GDP per capita in 2050 under scenario i, y
0
2050 is the GDP per capita in 2050 in base case scenario and y2011 is the 
GDP in the staring year.
Source: Derived from Bloom, Chen, and Sathar (2015). 
BOX 1:  MODEL USED TO PROJECT PROSPECTS FOR 
ECONOMIC GROW TH UNDER ALTERNATIVE 
DEMOGRAPHIC SCENARIOS
yt = −αyt + βwt + αwt + δlt + η
T Xt + €tα
Yt
Pt
Yt
Lt
yi2050 – y
0
2050
y2011
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“The speed at which fertility declines now 
in Sindh will determine the magnitude of 
the economic boost it will experience.”
